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Abstract
One of the most popular quality assurance mechanisms in
paid micro-task crowdsourcing is based on gold questions:
the use of a small set of tasks of which the requester knows
the correct answer and, thus, is able to directly assess crowd
work quality. In this paper, we show that such mechanism is
prone to an attack carried out by a group of colluding crowd
workers that is easy to implement and deploy: the inherent
size limit of the gold set can be exploited by building an infer-
ential system to detect which parts of the job are more likely
to be gold questions. The described attack is robust to various
forms of randomisation and programmatic generation of gold
questions. We present the architecture of the proposed sys-
tem, composed of a browser plug-in and an external server
used to share information, and briefly introduce its potential
evolution to a decentralised implementation. We implement
and experimentally validate the gold detection system, using
real-world data from a popular crowdsourcing platform. Fi-
nally, we discuss the economic and sociological implications
of this kind of attack.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is a growing solution to perform human
computation and to collect manual annotations, especially
useful in case of large-scale data and complex labelling tasks
on which machine-based algorithms still struggle.
Crowdsourcing has the capability of achieving high qual-
ity labelling, but it requires specific quality assurance mech-
anisms to deal with potential scammers interested in the
monetary reward attached to the tasks, incompetent work-
ers, and loss of attention (Daniel et al. 2018).
Many solutions that deal with low-quality contributions
in crowdsourcing have been proposed so far. For example,
Snow et al. (2008) propose a bias-correction and averaging
scheme to improve annotation quality. Ipeirotis, Provost, and
Wang (2010) use EM procedures in bias correction to detect
scammers. In the case of subjective tasks, Kittur, Chi, and
Suh (2008) propose the injection of verifiable questions, ar-
guing that they be included into otherwise subjective tasks
and answering the verifiable part correctly should take as
much effort as doing the whole task. Dow et al. (2011) in-
troduce peer-to-peer feedback systems to encourage worker
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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engagement and high-quality work. Gadiraju et al. (2015)
analyse the behavioural patterns of microtask workers to dif-
ferentiate trustworthy and untrustworthy workers.
The most commonly used technique for quality assurance
in crowdsourcing is the use of gold questions: a small set of
questions with known ground truth answers (Le et al. 2010;
Huang and Fu 2013) which are used to validate the accuracy
of crowd answers. Such set should have specific characteris-
tics (Oleson et al. 2011):
1. Relative small size to minimise its creation cost as cor-
rect answers are typically created by expert editors. More-
over, crowd workers need to be paid when answering such
questions that do not bring new information to the job.
2. Limited (or absent) repeated exposure of gold questions
to minimise the likelihood a worker will recognise them.
3. Objective, non-ambiguous true answers.
4. Even distribution amongst the possible answers in the
case of multiple-choice questions.
5. Semantically and structurally similar to the non-gold
questions to minimise the possibility of crowd workers
recognising them.
Point 1 is in direct contrast with points 2–5: generating a
collection of gold data with such requirements is costly be-
cause it needs to be tailored to the specific crowdsourcing
job and it needs to have a relatively large size (Bentivogli et
al. 2011). In some cases, it is possible to reduce this cost by
generating gold sets in a programmatic way (Oleson et al.
2011). In any case, building a gold set requires a compro-
mise between points 1 and 2: there is an inherent trade-off
between the size of the gold set and the cost of performing
gold questions in a batch. Thus we can make the following
fundamental assumption:
Assumption 1 The size of the gold set is notably smaller
than the size of the set of non-gold questions.
In this paper, we show that this inherent limit on the size
of the gold set can be exploited to perform an attack to the
crowdsourcing platform: workers can collude by using an
inferential system to detect which questions are likely to be
gold questions.
Such a system should have the following capabilities:
1. Ability to signal the likelihood for a task of being a gold
question1.
2. Anonymous (the worker is not identified by the system)
and secure (the content of the tasks is not circulated).
3. Ability to be used on any crowdsourcing platform where
the requester checks worker quality with a gold set con-
siderably smaller than the set of tasks to be evaluated,
and even if the gold questions are dynamically generated,
e.g., ‘solve the following arithmetic equation’, ‘answer
the captcha’, or more complicated solutions like the ones
presented in (Oleson et al. 2011).
4. Ability to support workers even in the relatively sporadic
cases when quality assurance mechanism can use intrinsic
metrics like transitivity checks (ifA > B andB > C then
A > C) (Buchholz and Latorre 2011).
To simplify the analysis, we will also make the following as-
sumption, that is satisfied in many crowdsourcing platforms
(as we verify in Section 4):
Assumption 2 Gold questions are shown to the worker
sampling uniformly at random from the gold set, with the
additional constraint each gold question can be shown only
once to each worker.
2 Proposed System
We now introduce the system able to perform the described
attack scheme to crowdsourcing quality checks using gold
questions. We consider the case of a batch of crowdsourc-
ing tasks (job). A subset of the workers involved in this job
are assumed to collude to attack the platform. In Figure 1, a
sketch of the interaction between workers and a third party
server, external to the crowdsourcing platform, is shown.
The basic structure and usage are simple: each crowd worker
Figure 1: Collaborative gold signalling structure.
runs a local browser plugin (or a javascript bookmarklet)
where a set of operations are executed to create a finger-
print of the tasks currently displayed in the browser. Then,
the pair (job ID, page hashes) is sent to the external server.
1The system is not aiming at providing the actual answer of a
signalled gold question, but just to identify them so that workers
can focus on answering them accurately.
The server will adopt an inference technique (explained in
Section 2.2) to update the information available for that job,
and to signal back to the worker the likelihood of each of the
current tasks being a gold question.
2.1 Client Workflow - Simhash
Figure 2 shows the pipeline of the operations executed by
the browser plugin of each colluding worker. Every time the
webpage Document Object Model (DOM) is updated, the
following operations are executed:
Anonymization The worker ID and other identifying infor-
mation are stripped out from the webpage. This is nec-
essary to guarantee plausible deniability, to protect from
watermarking, and to improve the possibility of identify-
ing similar gold questions.
ID/name tags removal Session IDs and name tags are
stripped out from the webpage (excluding tags contain-
ing attributes like “href” and “src”, to preserve the ability
to distinguish tasks).
Task splitting The page is split into different fragments,
one for each task (see Section 2.3) if needed.
Shingle/tokenization The HTML of each fragment is tok-
enized with classical 3-gram techniques, where the words
are either HTML tags or text content: in the latter case the
text is shingled (Damashek 1995).
Simhashing For each task (fragment) a simhash (Sadowski
and Levin 2007) is generated.
Using simhashes is the ideal solution for our problem be-
cause: (i) it allows a secure export of the task fingerprints,
without the risk of leaking the task online (as explained in
Section 2.5), (ii) it is fast and scalable, (iii) it allows to es-
timate similarity (by simply comparing the Manhattan dis-
tance of the simhashes) even for near-miss cases, enabling
the system to recognise gold questions that can differ by a
small part, e.g., captchas, arithmetic questions, or program-
matic gold (Oleson et al. 2011).
2.2 Server Workflow - Clustering
The server, described in the previous section, keeps a repos-
itory of triples (Job ID; simhash; multiplicity), where mul-
tiplicity is the number of times a simhash appears in the
collected data. The Manhattan distance matrix between the
bit representation of the simhashes can be used to generate
a clustering. Detecting similarity rather than exact matches
is important because of the potential presence of noise in
the task HTML collected from workers (i. e. differing frag-
ments due to dynamic rendering), and because gold ques-
tions whose hashes differ for only few bits (like captchas
and arithmetic questions) belong to the same cluster in our
framework even if they are not exact matches. After this pro-
cess, each cluster will represent a specific question, and have
a multiplicity that is equal to the number of times that ques-
tion has been posed to the participating workers. We will ini-
tially assume that all workers are colluding. In Section 4.2,
we discuss the effect of the number of colluding workers on
the attack performance.
Figure 2: Workflow of the hashing mechanism on the crowd worker side.
Gold Questions Inference. If Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied, we expect that the multiplicities of clusters will
have a bimodal distribution, where clusters corresponding
to gold questions will have a higher mean multiplicity, as
shown for a real case in Section 4, Figure 6. A simple Gaus-
sian mixture model with two modes will be enough to ob-
tain a classification of the current state of the repository of
simhashes, together with an estimate of the confidence of the
classification accuracy. The plugin has two states:
Idle state: If the model goodness of fit is low, the plugin
shows that there is not enough information: any question
could be gold.
Active state: When the goodness of fit is high, the plugin
signals which questions in the page are likely to be gold,
together with a probability score for each of them.
When only few samples are provided, overfitting can be a
problem: since we have only one dimension d (frequency)
for each cluster of simhashes, and two modes p, we have six
parameters to estimate (p(d2/2 + 3d/2 + 1)), and thus we
have to keep the plugin idle for a number of samples of five
times (Steyerberg, Harrell, and Frank 2003) the parameter
size, i. e. 30 samples. After that, the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) of the model compared with the correspond-
ing one-component model will be used to establish the state
of the plugin (Fraley and Raftery 1998). The performance of
the Gaussian mixture model (and thus the plugin state) de-
pends on the difference between the means of the two distri-
butions (and in some cases the two means can be very close,
as shown in Section 4, Figure 6). However, when the plugin
is active it means that a two-components Gaussian mixture
model explains the data better than a fit obtained by a unique
population, and for each question the worker is able to visu-
alise the posterior probability of being a gold question.
If the job presents regular patterns, like one gold question
per page, then the worker can decide to employ a more ag-
gressive behaviour, by answering carefully only to the ques-
tions that are signalled as gold.
The plugin does not need to know the proportion of gold
questions used, nor the proportion of colluding workers.
False Positives and Sensitivity. It is worth noticing that
there is a risk that non-gold questions are simhash similar,
with the consequence of having some of them ending up in
the same cluster and thus causing some false positives. How-
ever, this event can be detected and corrected when a page
contains multiple tasks, as shown in Section 2.3.
Due to the nature of the application, high recall is more
important than high precision in gold question detection:
from a worker perspective, false positives will lead to ad-
ditional work, but missing a gold question can potentially
disrupt a worker quality score (e.g., approval rate) in the
crowdsourcing platform. The server will return a probabil-
ity of being a gold question for each simhash submitted by
a worker. The user is then able, via the browser plugin, to
select the desired confidence threshold for the tasks being
signalled setting their own precision/recall trade-off.
2.3 Multiple Tasks per Page
The operation of task splitting explained in Section 2.1 is not
straightforward. It can be achieved in at least two ways:
1. Platform-based heuristic (e.g., Crowdflower uses a spe-
cific HTML class element to identify tasks in a page).
2. Heuristic based on document size: this affects the balance
between precision and recall.
In our experiments, which make use of Crowdflower (now
called Figure Eight) datasets, we use the former approach. If
this is not possible, a more conservative solution (with more
fragments) can be used to maximise recall: for example, a
very conservative solution could be to split the page at the
<div> tag level.
If multiple tasks appear in the same page, the server will
be able to use this information to perform a hash parameter
estimation: the minimum distance between the simhashes
belonging to the same page can be used to tune the clus-
tering algorithm and avoid that two different questions end
on the same cluster. Moreover, if the clustering algorithm
is able to use connectivity constraints, they can be enforced
for all simhashes known to be in the same page. It is possi-
ble to obtain the same information even when only one task
per page is used, by moving the parameter estimation on the
client side.
2.4 Peer-to-peer Implementation
The use of an external server where to centrally col-
lect data and perform the similarity computations can
be avoided, if required. All operations of clustering
and inference are lightweight and could potentially be
run locally by the worker in the browser: what is
needed is at least an append-only distributed peer-to-
peer database system, e.g., OrbitDB (https://github.
com/orbitdb/orbit-db), to collectively store and re-
trieve the triples (Job ID; simhash; multiplicity) and locally
compute the probability of a task being a gold question.
2.5 Plausible Deniability and Data Security
Crowd workers are sending only a simhash of the page with
identification information removed on the client side. More-
over, they are not sending any information about the ac-
tual judgements being performed. This is an important as-
pect that allows to minimise the risk of worker identification
through de-anonymisation (Aggarwal 2005), and thus ob-
taining plausible deniability for the workers. Moreover, po-
tential sensitive data in the job cannot be reconstructed, even
when the third party server is completely compromised.
3 Attack Model - Performance, Cold Start
To understand whether our framework is applicable in a real
crowdsourcing platform, we devise a model that allows us
to compute the probability of recognising a gold question.
Such model assumes that the parameters of the system are
known and that the report of a specific question will have
exactly the same simhash from all workers (so, in this theo-
retical model, we do not consider the cases of noisy HTML
or gold questions generated programmatically). In order to
obtain a closed form solution of the average probability of
recognition, we consider a gold question recognised by the
system only when it has been already reported a number
of times bigger than the (known) multiplicity of the non-
gold questions. Clearly, this under-estimates the probability
of recognition, because as we will show in the next section, a
statistical analysis between the multiplicities can be enough
to recognise a gold question. Moreover, such simple model
does not allow to estimate the false positive rate, that will
be studied in Section 4 over real data, but still it gives us
a quick and clean way to explore the effect of the different
parameters on the gold recognition probability.
Regarding the parameters of the system, we consider a
realistic scenario: a job of 2000 tasks with an additional 5%
(100 tasks) of gold questions.
We consider the default automatic behaviour of Crowd-
flower: 10 gold questions are used at the beginning to train
and test the ability of the worker (i.e., a quiz page). After
that, pages of 10 tasks are shown to the worker, of which 9
are requested tasks and one is a gold question. To be con-
sidered trusted, workers are required, by default, to judge a
minimum of four gold questions and to reach an accuracy
threshold of 70%. A similar setting can be implemented on
MTurk by creating qualification tests and by manually dis-
tributing gold questions in subsequent HITs.
Moreover, we consider the default Crowdflower aggrega-
tion setting: each requested (non-gold) task will be shown to
3 distinct workers. A gold question will not be shown twice
to the same worker: thus, for our setting, a maximum of 9
pages can be shown to each worker, with a total (includ-
ing the initial quiz page) of 100 unique gold questions per
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Figure 3: Probability of recognizing a gold question varying
the number of workers that have already used the system and
parametrized by the number of 10-task pages.
worker. Clearly, different workers may be required to eval-
uate the same gold questions. In Figure 3, we estimate the
probability that a gold question displayed to a worker is cor-
rectly detected by our system, after that a certain number
of workers already used the system for a specific job. This
number depends on how many tasks each worker will com-
plete on average. Even in the most conservative case (each
worker completing only 10 tasks) and assuming a uniform at
random distribution of gold questions, we can observe that
after 50 workers entered the job, the probability of correctly
detecting a gold question is above 99.9%. In Figure 4 we can
see a drastic fall in the probability of recognition when the
number of gold question increases, especially when a small
number of more prolific workers are contributing: if the av-
erage worker is completing 30 questions and more than 16%
of gold questions are available, the probability of recogni-
tion is below 20% even when 25% of the total work has been
already completed. It is worth noticing that in this simplified
model we assumed that all workers judge the same number
of pages. In reality, the typical engagement distribution has
a power-law distribution: we refer to Section 4 for a more
realistic analysis.
These results are promising but are based on the simpli-
fying assumptions of the model. For this reason, in the next
section we present the result of implementing and testing our
system over a real-world case study.
4 Experimental Analysis
4.1 Experimental Setting
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack scheme,
we simulate the attack over two real crowdsourcing exper-
iments. We use the CSTA datasets and task logs described
in (Benoit et al. 2016)2. An example of the task design is
shown in Figure 5. We will start with the first dataset, con-
2We used the jobs in the repository with ID f269506 and
f354285, available from https://github.com/kbenoit/
CSTA-APSR.
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16
Gold Ratio
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y 
o
f 
re
co
g
n
it
io
n
25% of total work completed
Pages per worker
1
2
3
Figure 4: Probability of recognizing a gold question after
25% of the total work, varying the gold questions ratio and
parametrized by the number of 10 tasks pages that each
worker evaluate.
sisting of 29,594 judgements from 336 workers and contain-
ing the platform logs for the submitted judgements, includ-
ing timestamps of each question and whether a gold question
has been missed.
In the first CSTA dataset, out of 2700 unique questions,
12.4% of them are gold questions. We selected this dataset
because of the unusual abundant number of gold questions,
and because each non-gold question have been answered by
10 workers with an average of 8.7 pages per worker, mak-
ing this example a particularly difficult case for this kind of
attack, as predicted by our model and shown in Figure 4.
Such an abundance of judgements and gold questions also
allows us to simply sub-sample these two parameters keep-
ing the rest of the log unchanged so that we can simulate
what would have happened if fewer gold questions or judge-
ments per question were to be used. Moreover, as shown
in Figure 5, the gold questions used in this experiment are
indistinguishable from the non-gold questions in terms of
design and structure: being able to distinguish them is thus
only possible through the statistical analysis of their mul-
tiplicity. At the end of this section we will show the result
for the second dataset, consisting of 76,183 judgements and
with a less challenging, more realistic distribution of gold
questions. In Figure 6, the distribution (in logarithmic scale)
of the multiplicity for gold and non-gold questions is shown:
we can see that there is a clear indication of a bimodal dis-
tribution for the count of gold and non-gold questions, even
if the two distributions overlap, making this dataset a good
candidate to understand the limits of our framework. How-
ever, the main unknown of this approach is the behaviour of
the system in the transient phase of the batch, that is, when
many gold questions still have a multiplicity similar to that
of non-gold questions (because of the high statistical vari-
ability when only a few workers have started the job and
shared their tasks). This transient phase is when false posi-
tives are more likely to happen. Ideally, the plugin should be
in idle state during this transient phase.
Figure 5: Design of the CSTA task. Workers have to select
the most appropriate policy area related to a specific sen-
tence presented to them in its context and the political scale
(left/right) where it positions itself.
Regarding the clustering phase to identify simhashes be-
longing to the same question, this job did not present sig-
nificant difficulties, because all simhashes belonging to the
same questions had a Manhattan distance of less than 2 bits,
even though they were reported by different workers with
potentially different DOM.
In order to avoid disrupting a real crowdsourcing job, we
decided to run the plugin on the reconstructed HTML ob-
tained from the logs, together with the crowd worker original
behaviour. The original designer of this job opted for having
an initial quiz of 10 questions, 8 of which being gold, and af-
ter that to present pages of 10 questions, one of which being
a gold question.
To study how the different parameters affect the proposed
system, we keep the behaviour and time evolution of the
worker fixed, but we vary the number of gold questions
available via sub-sampling (i.e., allowing us to move from
0% to 12.4% of gold questions in the job), assuming that the
worker ability to answer a gold-question is only dependent
on their internal state, and not on which gold question they
are being shown3.
We are able to compare the original behaviour of the
workers with the behaviour they would have by using the
proposed collaborative gold signalling technique.
To simplify the analysis, we assume the following be-
haviour for the workers when the plugin is in active state:
Time spent: The worker will spend time in answering only
the questions that are signalled as potential gold, spending
3The error made using this assumption should be mitigated by
the fact that all gold questions are sampled uniformly at random.
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Figure 6: Distribution (log scale) of the multiplicity for gold
and non-gold questions in the CSTA task when using 12.4%
of gold questions. Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
an amount of time per page equal to g · T , where g is the
number of signalled gold questions in that page, and T is
the time they spent on that page from the log.
Performance: The worker will answer randomly to any
gold-question that the plugin failed to signal (false neg-
ative). On the other hand, the workers will answer any
correctly signalled question normally (i.e., in the same
way they did in the logs, still potentially answering them
wrong even when correctly signalled). This is a worst-
case analysis: in practice we can expect workers to answer
more carefully to signalled questions.
Confidence: The worker will consider as gold all questions
with signalled probability of being gold of at least 50%.
This simulation setup guarantees that the individual accu-
racy of each worker is preserved: indeed whenever the plu-
gin is idle, we will use the original performance recon-
structed from the logs. We can notice that the likelihood
threshold to receive the signals could be modified to reduce
the false negative rate, at the expense of more false posi-
tives: thus, there is a trade-off between the time saved by the
worker and the performance loss. We did not perform such
optimisation and leave this aspect for a future study. How-
ever, it is worth noticing that the worker is able to set up
their level of risk locally in the plugin, because the Gaussian
mixture model is able to provide a probability of classifica-
tion of each question provided, that can be then filtered on
the client side.
4.2 Experimental Results
We show the results of the experimental analysis by mea-
suring the worker accuracy and the time spent per page for
the proposed method, and we compare such measures with
the values from the original platform logs. We modified the
logs via sub-sampling, varying the number of gold questions
available and the number of judgements performed for each
non-gold question. For the rest of the paper, we choose a re-
alistic value of 4.4% of gold questions and compare it with
the higher value of 12.4%, more challenging to achieve in
practice due to the cost of generating gold questions; with
the same spirit, we will show the case of 4 and 10 judge-
ments collected for each non-gold question respectively. It
is important to notice that even the cases with low gold ra-
tio and number of judgements may be higher than the usual
parameters used in typical crowdsourcing experiments.
In Figure 7, the average worker accuracy is shown. When
the gold ratio is high, more time is required for the inferen-
tial system to gain precision. However, it is interesting to no-
tice that in all cases the accuracy of the workers have stayed
above the threshold of 70%, that was the value under which
a worker would have been rejected. Regarding the number
of judgements per non-gold question, we do not observe a
notable trend on the accuracy of the workers.
On the other hand, we can see in Figure 8 that the time a
worker will save by using the proposed system is consider-
ably higher when fewer judgements per non-gold question
are used, especially in the transient phase: this is because
the number of false positives is higher when the two distri-
butions of multiplicities (of gold and non-gold questions as
depicted in Figure 6) have a closer average value.
More importantly, we can see that if either the gold ra-
tio or number of judgements per page are low, the infer-
ential system will allow the workers to complete the tasks
in one fifth of the original time (after the transient phase):
this means that on average, the worker will only need to an-
swer to 2 questions per page, ignoring 8 questions per page,
without a significant loss in accuracy. This result shows that
the proposed system can completely disrupt the gold set
paradigm for quality control.
Finally, we repeated the whole experiment on the biggest
dataset from the CSTA repository, with ID f354285. The
dataset consists of 76,183 judgements from 230 workers
Of the unique 13,371 questions, a 4.3% of them are gold
questions, and each question have been judged 5 times. We
did not perform sub-sampling. The results are shown in
Figure 9. Even in this case, the accuracy of the workers
never dropped below the threshold of 0.7. After the transient
phase, we observed a reduction of accuracy of the 4% and
a time saved of about 50%: on average the workers had to
answer only to half of the questions in the page to maintain
an accuracy that allowed them to complete the entire job.
Number of ColludingWorkers. In all experiments in this
section, we considered the scenario where all workers are
colluding. While an extensive study of the relaxation of this
assumption is a major undertaking and left for future work,
we can discuss its implications in the simple case in which
all workers have equal retention and all enter the job at ran-
dom times. If not all workers are colluding, some gold ques-
tions will not be reported. However, by Assumption 2, this is
equivalent to having those gold questions still not reported
because of entering early in a batch. The result is thatM col-
luding workers (over a total ofN workers) can at best expect
to reach, towards the end of the batch, an accuracy equiva-
lent to the one achievable when all workers are colluding and
only M
N
of the batch has been completed. However, the pres-
ence of non-colluding workers is not affecting in any other
way the inference mechanism.
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Figure 7: Average worker accuracy for the original logs and for the proposed method. On the left, each non-gold question has
10 judgements, on the right 4. On the top row we used a number of gold questions equal to 4.4%, on the bottom row 12.4%.
5 Countermeasures
In this section we describe possible approaches to deal with
the proposed attack scheme.
Gold set size. A potential countermeasure that would
make the attack more difficult is to increase the gold size
set. This will however significantly increase the overall data
collection cost. In (Clough et al. 2013), the cost of gener-
ating gold questions for the relevance assessment problem
was estimated to be above 4 times the minimum wage (for
a senior civil servant). This means that in our example, as-
suming to pay the crowd workers minimum wage, in order
to move from a gold set size of 4.4% to 12.4% (as shown
in Figure 8), it would be required an additional 54% of the
crowdsourcing cost already undertaken.
Number of judgements. An alternative solution is to in-
crease the number of judgements required per non-gold
question. However, from our experiments it seems that the
effectiveness of this solution is rather limited. Moreover,
there is an additional crowdsourcing cost to be taken in ac-
count for such an approach.
Worker retention. As shown in Section 3, having crowd
workers with high retention will significantly reduce the
strength of this attack, because of the reduced initial assess-
ment requirement, and because of the fact that each worker
will only see different gold questions. In other words, af-
ter a fixed number of tasks are completed, the probability
of having gold questions with high multiplicity in the in-
ferential system is low if those tasks have been completed
by few prolific workers, because the total number of gold
questions shown will be lower (because of fewer initial as-
sessments) and because the probability of having repeated
gold questions overall will be lower than the corresponding
scenario where many workers completed the same number
of tasks. This solution is interesting because increasing re-
tention (e.g., through better task design or reward schemes)
can also improve the quality of the work thanks to learning
effects on long-standing workers (Difallah et al. 2014).
Non uniform selection from the gold set. Another coun-
termeasure can be to not satisfy Assumption 2: instead of
sampling uniformly at random from the pool of questions
that have not yet been shown to the worker, there could be a
better approach that takes into account the overall sequence
of gold questions shown and the possible existence of this
attack scheme, potentially mitigating its effectiveness, espe-
cially if worker retention is not uniformly distributed.
Programmatic gold questions. Using always different,
dynamic generated gold questions, as in (Oleson et al. 2011),
that also have sufficiently distant simhashes would be an
ideal solution. This could be achieved also by modifying
carefully the way the questions are rendered. However, this
approach would require a careful design phase again in-
creasing the initial setup cost.
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Figure 8: Average time spent per page for original and proposed method on first dataset. On the left each non-gold question has
10 judgements, on the right 4. On the top row we used a number of gold questions equal to 4.4%, on the bottom row 12.4%.
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Figure 9: Average worker accuracy for the original logs and
for the proposed method on the second dataset.
Additional quality controls. Using additional quality
controls, like punishing workers that are too fast in answer-
ing could make this attack harder. However, this can increase
the number of gold preys: workers that are performing as ex-
pected but ends up failing the quality control because they
are faster than the average (Gadiraju et al. 2015).
6 Societal and Economic Implications
It could be argued that the gold set quality assurance
paradigm has similar effects to the classical panopticon ef-
fect in the workplace (Vorvoreanu and Botan 2000; Botan
1996; D’Urso 2006; Stahl 2008). That is, workers’ under-
standing that they might be being observed at any single
moment means they feel compelled to self-govern their be-
haviour at all times in line with the employer’s wishes.
As Holland, Cooper, and Hecker (2015), Snyder (2010),
and Knox (2010) has shown, electronic surveillance of this
kind is correlated with reduction of trust in management,
perceived quality of the workplace relationship and can neg-
atively impact work effort, attitudes, and communication in
the workplace.
On the other hand, the current crowdsourcing platform
architectures, by design, do not allow for different quality
assurance mechanisms: workers are anonymous, undiffer-
entiated and indistinguishable, and thus the construction of
a trust relationship between crowd worker and requester is
very arduous. In (McInnis et al. 2016), reducing rejection
risk and building trust towards requesters is identified as a
top priority to improve outcomes for all parties in online
labour markets.
The architecture of crowdsourcing systems clearly has an
important impact on both labour quality and worker satisfac-
tion. The inherently dynamic nature of crowdsourcing plat-
forms make the aforementioned quality assurance mecha-
nisms potentially prone to abuse against workers, but at the
same time exposes many novel techniques for worker self-
organization and efforts to constitute a more equal power
balance between workers and requesters. Reconceptualising
the idea of the ‘exploit’ from hacker culture, Galloway and
Thacker argue that in the networked age those that aim to
resist dominant power structures must turn their attention
to the ‘vulnerabilities’ embedded within networked infras-
tructures and leverage these ‘exploits’ for the purpose of
bringing about positive social change. The framework we
presented here is a clear example of this kind of exploit,
functioning as a form of ‘sousveillance’ - or, watching from
below - by turning the gaze back on the requesters.
Should the system described in this paper take hold in the
crowdsourcing community, it would negatively impact the
effectiveness of the gold question paradigm for quality as-
surance, forcing a shift towards different quality assurance
approaches. In a way, the proposed system allows an indirect
form of horizontal communication, re-balancing in part the
digital power imbalance (Cushing 2013; Sandford 2006) be-
tween workers and requesters and enabling, rephrasing and
adapting to this context (Marx 2003; Kulynych 1997), a less
passive and quiescent labour force (Salehi et al. 2015).
With our efforts, we encourage the crowdsourcing re-
search community to push towards a direction, e.g., hav-
ing more transparency and data portability across plat-
forms (Sarasua and Thimm 2014), or having collective dis-
pute resolution mechanisms (McInnis et al. 2016), where
trust between requesters and crowd workers can be achieved
(e.g., the direction in which TurkOpticon is going (Irani and
Silberman 2013)), removing the need of such granular qual-
ity assurance techniques.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that the popular gold question
method for quality assurance is prone to an attack carried
out by a group of colluding crowd workers that is easy to
implement and deploy. We described an inferential system
based on a browser plugin and a server, that can exploit the
inherent limited size of the gold set to detect which parts of
a crowdsourcing job are more likely to be gold questions.
We have also showed how the described attack is robust
to various forms of randomisation and programmatic gen-
eration of gold questions4. Integration with existing plugins
like TurkOpticon (Irani and Silberman 2013) is left for fu-
ture work where we envision implementing a ‘traffic light’
alert system for signalling potential gold questions to work-
ers similar to the way TurkOpticon signals requester reputa-
tion levels.
From real-world crowdsourcing experiments, we saw that
when using the proposed method, workers are required to
answer to only half (or even a fifth, in some conditions) of
the questions presented to them, still maintaining an accu-
racy level high enough to avoid being excluded from the job.
Regarding potential countermeasures, we observed that
increasing the gold set size or the number of judgements
per question might be useful but infeasible in terms of cost.
On the other hand, we noticed that increasing worker re-
tention through, for example, better task design might be a
win-win solution that could also make crowd workers more
4The core functionalities of the plugin are available at
http://github.com/AlessandroChecco.
satisfied and performing better. Other countermeasures that
could be explored are the use of programmatic gold creation
and probabilistic choice of the order in which the gold ques-
tions are posed.
Finally, we discussed the economic and sociological im-
plications of these kind of attacks where we pointed out the
positive repercussion on the future of crowd work of the cre-
ation of stronger and long-term worker-requester relation-
ships where bilateral trust can be established.
Regarding future research directions, other than explor-
ing the proposed countermeasures in detail, it would be in-
teresting to refine the attack scheme by using locally op-
timised likelihood thresholds to balance the time saved by
the workers and their loss in accuracy. Moreover, it is nec-
essary to study the robustness of the method with respect
to the number of workers colluding and coordinated attack
times (Lasecki, Teevan, and Kamar 2014; Difallah, Demar-
tini, and Cudre´-Mauroux 2012).
More advanced collusion attack schemes may include the
sharing of the correct answer for gold questions, that would
increase even more the gain in time spent and reduce the risk
of being detected.
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